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Party membership and charitable giving in China:  
The mediating role of resources, networks, prosocial values, and making compulsory donations 
 
Abstract: 
Previous studies suggest Communist Party members in China are more likely to give and give 
more to charity, but why remains unclear. Using the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS, 
2012), this study develops and tests hypotheses about the potential mechanisms that influence 
the relationship between Party membership and charitable giving. Uniquely, total charitable 
giving in China includes both voluntary and compulsory donations. Generalized structural 
equation model results indicate that Party members donate more overall, because they have 
higher levels of human resources, larger formal networks, higher prosocial values and are 
more likely to make compulsory donations than non-Party members. Interestingly, our results 
show that making compulsory donations crowds out voluntary giving. Therefore, Party 
members donate only marginally more than non-Party members in terms of voluntary giving. 
 
Keywords: 




As an important component of philanthropy, charitable giving has attracted much attention in 
the academic literature. Previous studies have increased our understanding of how people’s 
socio-demographic characteristics relate to charitable giving. Scholars understand quite well 
how gender, age, education and income relate to giving, although this knowledge is primarily 
based on empirical studies using WEIRD samples (Western, Educated, living in 
Industrialized, Rich Democratic countries) (see Bekkers and Wiepking, 2007, 2011b; 
Wiepking and Bekkers, 2012 for a review of the literature). 
 Political party affiliation or political ideology is another relevant, less often 
studied characteristic influencing people’s donations to charitable organizations. 
Although there are some empirical studies focusing on the relationship between 
political ideology and charitable giving in WEIRD samples, most notably for the United 
States (e.g., Paarlberg et al., 2019) and the United Kingdom (e.g., Brown and Taylor, 
2019), there are less related to non-WEIRD samples. In this study, we contribute to the 
literature by taking China as the example to explore the relationship between political 
ideology and charitable giving. Unlike western democracies, the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) is the ruling party in China: although there are eight other political parties 
active in China, those eight parties do not have enough political power to compete with 
the CPC. Membership of the CPC (further referred to as “Party membership”) plays an 
important role in social life and is closely associated with human and social capital, 
including societal status. As such, China provides an interesting context to study the 
relationship between political affiliation and charitable giving. 
Researchers have studied several aspects of Party membership in China, including the 
antecedents (e.g., Appleton et al, 2009; Bian et al. 2001; Dickson, 2014) and the effects of 
being a Party member on individual political or managerial positions, economic returns and 
education or training (Li et al, 2007; Morduch and Sicular, 2000). When considering the 
relationship between Party membership and charitable giving, previous literature suggests 
Party members are more likely to give and give more to charity (Hu and Shen, 2013; Wu et 
al, 2018). However, those studies do not shed light on the possible mechanisms that can 
explain why Party members donate more. 
This study intends to fill the gap. Building on previous literature and using the Chinese 
General Social Survey (CGSS, 2012), this study develops and tests hypotheses about how 
human resources, social networks, prosocial values, and the unique Chinese system of 
compulsory donations prompted by government agencies or units (danwei)i influence the 
relationship between Party membership and charitable giving in China.  
 
Literature review and hypotheses 
 
Although previous studies have not directly examined the potential mechanisms explaining 
the relationship between Party membership and charitable giving, they provide useful 
directions. Building upon the previous literature, we identify four influencing factors: human 
resources (i.e., education, income), social networks, prosocial values, and making compulsory 




Previous literature argues that people with a higher education are more likely to have more 
financial resources, stronger prosocial attitudes, higher cognitive abilities and are more 
trusting, which increases their likelihood and level of charitable giving (Bekkers and 
Wiepking, 2011b; Wiepking and Maas, 2009). Empirical studies confirm these relationships 
not only for the U.S. and Western Europe, but also for non-Western countries such as Iran 
and Turkey (Aghababa et al, 2015; Çarkoğlu et al, 2017). In China, Party members typically 
have higher levels of education (Bian et al, 2001; Hauser, 2003). Education functions as a 
selection criterion for Party membership, as the higher educated are more likely to be 
accepted as Party members (Bian et al, 2001; Hauser, 2003). Furthermore, Party members are 
provided with more opportunities to further their education and training (Hauser, 2003). 
Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Party members are higher educated than non-Party members, which increases their total 
giving. 
 
Income is the financial foundation for charitable giving. Research indicates charitable giving 
is positively associated with income, which means income increases the probability and 
amount of giving (Auten et al, 2002; Bekkers and Wiepking, 2007). In terms of Party 
membership and income, Party members have higher income levels on average (Knight and 
Yueh, 2008; Morduch and Sicular, 2000). As with education, income is both a selection into 
and a consequence of Party membership. Those with higher levels of income are more likely 
to become Party members, and Party members are more likely to work in high-earning 
sectors, get prestigious jobs and hold higher-level positions, which in turn lead to higher 
levels of income (Bian et al, 2001; Morduch and Sicular, 2000). Party membership can also 
help members obtain political capital and political advantages (Appleton et al, 2009; 
McLaughlin, 2017), which may also help explain why Party members have higher levels of 
income. The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Party members have higher levels of income than non-Party members, which increases 
their total giving. 
 
Social networks 
Several studies conducted in a Western European and North American context have found 
that social networks promote charitable donations (Glanville et al, 2016; Herzog and Yang, 
2018; Wiepking and Maas, 2009). These results have also been found within the Chinese 
context (Wu et al, 2018; Yang et al, 2019). The key mechanism may be solicitation: people 
with wider social networks are more likely to be requested to donate (Bekkers and Wiepking, 
2011a). People with larger social networks tend to be members of a larger number of 
voluntary organizations (McPherson et al, 2001), which increases the probability of being 
asked to donate and thus increases charitable donations. Wiepking and Maas (2009) also find 
that stronger cognitive ability, and higher levels of generalized trust, empathic concern and 
church attendance can explain the positive relationship between social networks and 
charitable donations. 
 In China, Party membership helps people build social networks to establish personal 
security and promote personal development (Pye, 1999). Accessibility to higher levels of 
education and training also helps Party members to build stronger social networks (Guo and 
Shan, 2009). In an empirical study, Munasib and Tian (2015) used data from the Chinese 
General Social Survey to explore the impact of Party membership on social networks. Their 
results showed that Party members have larger social networks. Hence, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H3: Party members have larger social networks than non-Party members, which increases 
their total giving. 
 
Prosocial values 
Charitable giving is closely associated with prosocial values such as moral obligation, 
prosocial role identity, empathic concern, and the principle of care (De Wit and Bekkers, 
2016; Einolf, 2011; Wilhelm and Bekkers, 2010). That is, people who have higher levels of 
prosocial values are more likely to show empathy to others and care for others more strongly, 
and are therefore more likely to display prosocial behavior such as charitable giving. As 
stated by the Communist Party Constitution in China, the purpose of the CPC is to serve the 
people wholeheartedly. The Communist Party Constitution requires members to have a sense 
of dedication and be ready to serve Chinese people, and prosocial values are installed in Party 
members through official propaganda and Party classes and meetings. As a result, Party 
members may have higher levels of prosocial values than non-Party members. Therefore, we 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H4: Party members have higher levels of prosocial values than non-Party members, which 
increases their total giving. 
 
Compulsory donations 
We propose that the system of compulsory donations (qiangzhi juanzeng) is also an important 
mechanism facilitating charitable giving in China. Making compulsory donations, which 
refers to the phenomenon that individuals are coerced to donate by government or their units 
(danwei), is not uncommon in China, although two important laws (the Philanthropy 
Donation Law in 1998 and the Charity Law in 2016) both prohibit compulsory donations. 
According to a recent online survey (N=1,006) in China conducted by China Philanthropy 
Times, as many as 82% of respondents experienced requests for compulsory donations during 
their school or work careers (Wu, 2019). People may either be required to donate a specific 
amount of money or a percentage of their income. 
The emergence of compulsory donations in China is associated with particular economic 
(i.e., long-term planned economy), political (i.e., authoritarian government), cultural (i.e., 
collectivism and hierarchical culture) and social (i.e., different understanding of philanthropy) 
backgrounds. It is important to explain this different understanding of philanthropy in China, 
compared to the understanding of philanthropy in Western European or North American 
contexts. The principle that philanthropy is voluntary behavior is deeply rooted in those 
contexts, but many Chinese people do not have a strong belief in philanthropy on a voluntary 
basis. From the Chinese government’s perspective, philanthropy is viewed as a useful means, 
a tool or instrument, to accomplish tasks or achieve goals. Achieving certain goals, such as 
providing services to marginalized groups using charitable donations, is more important than 
emphasizing that philanthropy should be voluntary rather than compulsory. 
In China, making compulsory donations resembles a political mission assigned by 
government or their units, which means the best or even the sole option is to comply with the 
request and donate. People may face potential negative consequences if they fail to obey what 
is required. In an empirical study conducted in Jinan, China, Xu (2013) found that if the 
public servant of the street office (jiedao banshichu) refused to do voluntary work as 
required, an amount would be deducted from her salary. Although Xu’s (2013) study focuses 
on compulsory volunteering, its conclusion can be applicable to making compulsory 
donations. Therefore, it is unsurprising to find that in the aforementioned online survey (Wu, 
2019), more than 71% of respondents indicated that they donated when they received a 
request to make a compulsory donation. 
 Compared to non-Party members, Party members are more likely to work in public-
sector and state-owned enterprises (Dickson, 2014; Morduch and Sicular, 2000), which 
increases the probability of encountering requests for compulsory donations. The CPC is a 
highly organized party and it can mobilize its members to donate to charity (Dickson, 2014). 
Party members can also provide special Party membership dues (teshu dangfei) to Party 
organizations to support charitable and other public causes (Li and Lu, 2018). Such 
mobilization and special dues can be viewed as making compulsory donations, as Party 
members might fear the power of the Party organization and not want to face negative 
consequences associated with non-compliance. In addition, organizational citizenship 
literature suggests organizations expect their members to be good citizens and good 
citizenship is crucial in building reputation and career advancement opportunities (Organ et 
al., 2005), thus increasing the probability of complying with requests for compulsory 
donations. 
 Compulsory donations may crowd out voluntary donations. First, assuming people 
have a fixed budget for charitable giving, any increase in compulsory donations may decrease 
their level of voluntary giving. Second, some people may view compulsory donations as their 
contribution to philanthropy, thus being less likely to donate voluntarily. Finally, making 
compulsory donations may make people dissatisfied with or even averse to philanthropic 
causes (Feng and Zhang, 2014), so it is reasonable to expect that making compulsory 
donations leads to a lower probability and smaller amounts of voluntary giving. 
We argue that the crowding-out effect of compulsory donations on voluntary giving may 
influence the relationship between compulsory donations and total charitable giving 
(consisting of voluntary and compulsory giving) in two different ways, and hence we 
formulate two hypotheses. When compulsory donations completely crowd out voluntary 
donations, total giving will remain constant (H5a). When compulsory donations only partially 
crowd out voluntary donations or when no crowding out occurs, total giving will increase 
(H5b). 
 
H5: Party members are more likely than non-Party members to make compulsory donations, 
which leaves their total giving constant (H5a) or increases their total giving (H5b). 
  
Figure 1 presents the conceptual framework of this study. 
 
<< Insert Figure 1 here >> 
 
Data and methods 
Data 
We test our hypotheses using data from the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS, 2012). 
Starting in 2003 and conducted by Renmin University of China (RUC), the CGSS is a 
nationally representative social survey in China. It adopts the multistage stratified sampling 
and collects data from different levels (i.e., individual, household and community levels) in 
most provinces of mainland China. 
CGSS is an independently pooled cross-sectional database, and questions in the CGSS 
change between different years. Because the relevant questions on charitable donations are 
included only in CGSS 2012, this is the only wave we can use in our study. There is an 
independent philanthropy module in CGSS 2012, which consists of incidence of giving, 
amount donated, voluntariness of giving, incidence of volunteering and hours of volunteering. 
The response rate for the CGSS 2012 is 71.5%. 
Note that there were two different questionnaires in CGSS 2012 and each questionnaire 
applied to half of all the samples. Only one questionnaire has questions about philanthropy, so 
only 5,819 respondents out of 11,765 sampled in 2012 were asked about their philanthropic 
behavior. After deleting missing values for dependent, independent and mediating variables, 
we finally obtained 4,920 cases for data analysis. When comparing the results from multiple 
imputed data with the results from analyses using list-wise deletion, there were no significant 
differences. Therefore, we report the results of list-wise deletion of missing values. 
 
Measures 
Dependent variable: Charitable giving. CGSS asked respondents “in which of the following 
sectors and how much did you donate in 2011?”, where respondents could select “no 
donations” or “made donations and list the amount”. There are nine different philanthropic 
sectors listed: religion, helping the poor and disaster relief, health and medical sector, 
education, environmental protection and animal welfare, art and culture, community service, 
multiple sectors and others. We summarized the amount of giving to each sector for every 
respondent to measure their total charitable giving. Charitable giving was log transformed to 
satisfy statistical assumptions (i.e., normal distribution) and reduce estimation bias. Table 1 
provides an overview of the percentage of people donating and average amounts donated to 
the different philanthropic sectors. Respondents donated most often (27.17%) and highest 
amounts (RMB 318.14, about USD 49.25) to the sector focusing on helping the poor and 
disaster relief, while the art and culture sector received the lowest percentage of donations 
(0.22%) and smallest average amount (RMB 0.67, about USD 0.10). 
 
<<Insert Table 1 here>> 
 
Independent variable: Party membership. CGSS asked respondents about their present Party 
membership, with four possible responses: Communist Party member, democratic party 
member, Communist Youth League member, and the mass. As discussed above, there are 
eight democratic political parties in China in addition to the CPC and some people join the 
democratic parties. The Communist Youth League is a political organization affiliated to the 
Communist Party but comprises youth in China. Mass (qunzhong) means people who do not 
belong to any of the above three. Due to the close relationship between the CPC and the 
Communist Youth League as well as other democratic parties, members in these 
organizations can be considered very similar to each other, so we grouped them into the Party 
member category. The mass group was classified as the non-Party member category 
(reference category). 
Mediating variables: Education. CGSS asked respondents “what is your present highest 
level of education?”, with responses ranging from “no formal education completed” to 
“master’s or above”. We recoded education into a continuous variable using years of 
education: no formal education is 0 year, graduating from old-style private school (sishu) or 
primary school is 6 years, from junior middle school is 9 years, from senior middle school, 
vocational middle school (zhiye gaozhong), special secondary school (zhongzhuan) or 
technical school (jixiao) is 12 years, from college for professional training (dazhuan) is 14 
years, from university with a bachelor’s degree is 16 years and from university with a 
master’s degree or above is 18 years. 
Income. CGSS asked respondents “what was your total household income in 2011?”. 
This was used to measure annual household income. Income was log transformed to satisfy 
statistical assumptions (i.e., normal distribution) and reduce estimation bias as well. 
Social networks. In CGSS social networks were measured in two categories: formal 
networks and informal networks. To measure formal social networks, CGSS asked 
respondents whether they were active members of the following nine types of organizations: 
political organizations community organizations, nonprofit organizations, right/movement 
organizations, religious organizations, alumni associations, entertainment or hobby 
organizations, labor unions, and professional organizations. Because there may be overlap 
between membership of the CPC and membership of political organizations, membership of 
political organizations was excluded from our measure for formal social networks. 
Respondents could choose to “be a member and attend actively” (recoded as 1) “be a member 
but not attend actively” (recoded as 0.5) and “not a member” (recoded as 0). We added up the 
number of the response for each organization to operationalize formal networks of 
respondents. The question we used to measure informal social networks, was “how often do 
you communicate or entertain with your neighbors or friends”, with responses ranging from 
“almost every day” to “never”. We recoded this to frequency per month, ranging from 0 to 
30. 
Prosocial values. The CGSS asked respondents the extent to which they agreed with the 
following statement: “I would like to make a contribution to society”, with responses ranging 
from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” on a 7-point scale. Responses were inverted so 
that higher scores corresponded to higher levels of prosocial values.  
Made compulsory donations. In the philanthropy module, the CGSS asked respondents 
to indicate to what degree they voluntarily donated in 2011. For the following three levels of 
voluntariness – “completely voluntary donations”, “voluntary donations initiated by 
government or units” and “completely compulsory donations by government or units” – 
respondents indicated that they either made “no donations” or “made donations and list the 
amount”. Although “voluntary donations initiated by government or units” seems to be 
voluntary, it is actually compulsory under most circumstances. In fact, it is reported that many 
compulsory donations in China fall under the banner of voluntary charitable giving. So, both 
“voluntary donations initiated by government or units” and “completely compulsory 
donations by government or units” can be classified as compulsory donations. In this study, 
we coded making compulsory donations as a dummy variable: made no compulsory 
donations (reference category) and made compulsory donations. 
Control variables. In addition, we controlled for several variables found to be potential 
influencing factors on charitable giving in the existing literature: having a partner (“no 
partner” as reference), male (female as reference), owning a house (“no house” as reference), 
religiosity (“don’t believe in any religion” as reference), voluntary services (“no 
volunteering” as reference), urban (“not urban” as reference), rural (“not rural” as reference)ii 
and having children (“no children” as reference), all included as binary variables in the 
analyses. Self-perceived health status, self-perceived level of happiness and generalized trust, 
which is measured by the question “generally speaking, do you agree that most people can be 
trusted?”, are all ordinal variables measured using a five-point Likert scale. Age, measured in 
years, is a continuous variable. We also included an age-square term to control for the 
possible non-linear relationship between age and charitable giving. 
Table 2 reports the main descriptive statistics of variables in this study, including mean, 
standard deviation, minimum and maximum. 
 
<<Insert Table 2 here>> 
 
Analytical strategy 
First, we conducted descriptive analyses. We compared the differences between Party 
members and non-Party members on the amount of total charitable giving, human resources, 
social networks, prosocial values, and probability of making compulsory donations. We used 
an independent sample T-test and !" test to examine if the differences are statistically 
significant. 
 To test the hypotheses in this paper, we used generalized structural equation 
modeling (SEM) to explore the possible mediating mechanisms between Party membership 
and charitable giving. Relative to other statistical methods, SEM is more suitable for the 
analysis of mediating mechanisms. However, SEM is usually used for continuous dependent 
variables. Unlike typical continuous variables, our dependent variable (i.e., charitable giving) 
is left-censored at zero. Using ordinary least squares (OLS) to analyze censored variables will 
lead to biased estimates, but standard Tobit regression can correct the biases and provide 
efficient and unbiased estimates (Tobin, 1958). To combine the standard Tobit regression and 
structural equation modeling, generalized structural equation modeling was adopted in this 
study (Stata Manual, 2013). 
Charitable giving is usually viewed as a voluntary prosocial behavior (Anheier, 2014). 
Our analyses so far considered total charitable giving, including both voluntary giving and 
compulsory donations. Do Party members give more than non-Party members in terms of 
voluntary giving? Do the aforementioned mediating mechanisms still play important roles in 
voluntary giving when compulsory donations are controlled for? In the third stage, we 
excluded the compulsory donations from total giving and adopted generalized structural 
equation modeling again to explore whether human resources, social networks and prosocial 




Charitable giving, education, income, formal networks, prosocial values and making 
compulsory donations differed strongly between Party members and non-Party members, as 
shown in Table 3. Independent sample T-test and !"	test results indicate that Party members 
donated more than non-Party members, and had higher levels of educational attainment, 
household income, larger formal networks, higher prosocial values and were more likely to 
make compulsory donations than non-Party members. However, there was no significant 
difference between Party and non-Party members in terms of times a month they 
communicated or entertained with neighbors or friends (p > 0.1), our measure for informal 
networks. 
 
<<Insert Table 3 here>> 
 
Mediation analyses on Party membership and total charitable giving 
To explore the mediating relationships and test our hypotheses, we ran generalized structural 
equation models. We present results from these models in Table 4. Columns 1 to 6 report the 
model results of the relationship between Party membership and the possible mediating 
variables, and the final column shows a full model which describes the relationship between 
Party membership, the mediators and charitable giving. 
 
<<Insert Table 4 here>> 
 
Model 1 shows that education significantly mediated the relationship between Party 
membership and charitable giving. Party members had on average 2.2 more years of 
education when other variables in the model were held constant (p ≤ 0.001). As shown in 
Model 7, again holding all other variables constant, one more year of education corresponded 
to 10.6% higher charitable giving (p ≤ 0.001). Therefore, our results supported Hypothesis 1. 
 In line with Hypothesis 2, income also played an important role in mediating Party 
membership and charitable giving. As shown in Model 2, compared to the non-Party 
members, Party members had approximately 25.2% more household income (p ≤ 0.001). 
Model 7 indicates that a 1% increase in household income was associated with a 0.46% 
increase in charitable giving (p ≤ 0.001). So, Party members had higher levels of income, and 
this corresponded to higher levels of charitable giving. 
 Regarding formal networks, Model 3 suggests that Party members scored 0.3 higher 
than non-Party members in active organizational membership (p ≤ 0.001). Party members 
joined more organizations and were more active in those organizations. A one-unit increase in 
levels of formal networks correlated with a 45.2% increase in charitable giving, as shown in 
Model 7 (p ≤ 0.001). Unlike the mediation relationship between Party membership, formal 
networks and charitable giving, informal networks provided a different picture. Party 
members did not have more informal network interactions than non-Party members ($= 
0.210, p > 0.1), and informal networks were not significantly associated with the amount of 
charitable giving ($= -0.016, p > 0.1). As a result, Hypothesis 3 was only partially supported. 
 Empirical results also confirmed the mediating role of prosocial values. Model 5 
indicates that Party members scored 0.2 higher than non-Party members in terms of prosocial 
values (p ≤ 0.001). That is, Party members had higher levels of prosocial values. Model 7 
suggests that one level increase in prosocial values was associated with 33.7% increase in 
total giving (p ≤ 0.001). Hence prosocial values significantly mediated the relationship 
between Party membership and total giving. 
 In terms of the last hypothesis, our results supported H5b: Party members were more 
likely than non-Party members to make compulsory donations, which increased their total 
giving. According to Model 6, the log-odds of making compulsory donations were 0.8 higher 
for Party members than for non-Party members when other variables were held constant (p ≤ 
0.001). This means that, relative to non-Party members, the probability of making compulsory 
donations for Party members was 1.3 times higher (exp(0.830)-1). In addition, Model 7 also 
indicates compulsory donations correlated with a more than 6.6 times increase in total 
charitable giving (p ≤ 0.001). Therefore, our results showed that making compulsory 
donations was a significant mediating variable. 
 In addition, we also decomposed the total effects of Party membership on charitable 
giving into direct and indirect effects, and compared the different indirect effects, as shown in 
Table 5. We can conclude that the total effect of Party members on charitable giving was 
6.617 (p ≤ 0.001), while the direct effect was 0.177 but not statistically significant (p > 0.1). 
In terms of the indirect effects, education, income, formal networks, prosocial values and 
making compulsory donations were significant pathways to explain the relationship, but their 
effect sizes were different. The indirect effect of making compulsory donations was much 
larger than that of education, income, formal networks and prosocial values, which means 
making compulsory donations had a larger and more substantial effect than other mediators 
on the positive relationship between Party members and total charitable giving. 
 
<<Insert Table 5 here>> 
 
Mediation analyses on Party membership and voluntary charitable giving 
So far, we have analyzed is the relationship between Party membership and total charitable 
giving. However, charitable giving is usually viewed as a voluntary prosocial behavior, and 
making compulsory donations violates this basic principle of charitable giving. Previous 
literature suggests that Party members donate more to charity in China, but charitable giving 
in these previous studies often means total charitable giving and does not distinguish 
voluntary giving from compulsory donations (e.g., Hu and Shen, 2013; Wu et al, 2018). 
Therefore, and especially given the importance of compulsory donations in the analyses we 
have reported so far, it is relevant to further explore the relationship between Party 
membership and voluntary charitable giving. 
 The average amount of voluntary charitable giving was RMB 228.28 (approximately 
USD 35.34) for Party members and RMB 138.43 (approximately USD 21.43) for non-Party 
members – a marginally statistically significant difference (p ≤ 0.1). When studying only 
voluntary charitable donations, do the aforementioned mediating mechanisms play similar 
important roles in voluntary giving? Table 6 reports the results for the generalized structural 
equation model, similar to Table 4. Table 7 presents total, direct and indirect effects in the 
model comparable to Table 5. From tables 6 and 7, we find similar results compared to tables 
4 and 5. 
 
<<Insert tables 6 and 7 here>> 
 
Education, income, formal networks, and prosocial values were significant mediating 
variables that prompted Party members to donate, but why did Party members make only 
marginally higher voluntary donations? We argue that the key reason is making compulsory 
donations. As with total giving, voluntary giving was positively associated with human 
resources, social networks and prosocial values. But unlike total giving, making compulsory 
donations crowded out voluntary giving. On the one hand, as we have confirmed, Party 
members were more likely to make compulsory donations. On the other, as explained in the 
hypotheses section and shown in Table 6, the amount of voluntary giving was negatively 
associated with making compulsory donations ($= -1.434, p ≤ 0.01). Therefore, Party 
members donated only marginally more than non-Party members in terms of voluntary 
giving. 
 
Conclusion and discussion 
 
Using data from the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS, 2012) and adopting generalized 
structural equation models, this paper analyzes the relationship between Party membership 
and charitable giving in China. We identify four types of mechanism to explain why Party 
members are more likely to donate and donate more, and our results partially confirm our 
hypotheses. Specifically, relative to non-Party members, Party members have higher levels of 
educational attainment, household income, larger formal networks, higher prosocial values, 
and are more likely to make compulsory donations, which make them donate significantly 
more in terms of total charitable giving. Moreover, the mediating variables have different 
indirect effects. Empirical results indicate that the effect of making compulsory donations is 
much larger than that of other mediators. Although Party members donate significantly more 
in terms of total charitable giving, our results find that they make only marginally higher 
voluntary donations than non-Party members. We argue that the key reason is that making 
compulsory donations crowds out voluntary giving. 
This paper makes three important contributions. First, it provides a new and unique 
perspective on the relationship between party affiliation or political ideology and charitable 
giving. Current literature predominantly focuses on Western European and North American 
contexts. By studying the relationship in China – a country with a unique political system of 
one ruling political party– we broaden the knowledge of the relationship between political 
affiliation and charitable giving by examining relationships between compulsory and 
voluntary donations. Second, previous empirical studies support the positive relationship 
between Party membership and charitable giving in China, but they do not shed light on the 
possible mechanisms shaping the relationship. This study provides the first comprehensive 
explanation as to why Party members are more likely to donate and donate more in China. 
And third, it contributes to our understanding of compulsory donations, which is a unique but 
understudied phenomenon, occurring in different forms in countries other than China, 
including the Church levy in Germany (Boyer et al, 2014), zakat in Islamic societies (Amuda, 
2013), tithing in some Christian countries, and the liturgy system in Ancient Athens (Reich, 
2018). 
There are also some limitations to this study. For example, there is the issue of a bi-
directional causal relationship between Party membership and education. As discussed in the 
theory section, people with higher levels of educational attainment are more likely to be 
admitted as Party members in China (which indicates a selection effect), and, in turn, Party 
members have more opportunities to achieve higher levels of education (which indicates a 
causality effect). The combination of selection and causality effects may not affect the 
second-stage analysis (i.e., the impact of education on charitable giving), but it may bias the 
first-stage analysis (i.e., the impact of Party membership on education). 
In terms of future research, more micro data are needed to confirm our findings. Due to 
there being only limited public micro data on philanthropy in China, only data sources such as 
CGSS 2012 can be used to test our hypotheses. Future research should adopt other databases 
to replicate this study. Moreover, in this study we use cross-sectional data, which have many 
disadvantages relative to longitudinal and experimental data. If possible, future research 
should collect longitudinal data and conduct social experiments to study the mediating factors 
that influence the relationship between political affiliation and charitable giving. 
This study also suggests the importance of studying compulsory donations. Among the 
mechanisms mediating the relationship between Party membership and total giving, it seems 
that making compulsory donations plays the most important role in China. As well as in 
China, forms of compulsory donations exist in other countries. It would be very interesting 
and relevant to study compulsory donations in these different contexts and to compare the 
results with the findings of this study to learn more about the external validity of this study. 
Does making compulsory donations play an important role in charitable giving in other 
countries? What are the similarities and differences between giving by social pressure, 
taxation and compulsory donations? What are the similarities and differences between secular 
compulsory donations and religious compulsory donations? However, as far as we know, 
there are no other empirical studies studying different forms of compulsory donations. 
Systematic research on compulsory donations would therefore be a very relevant and 
interesting direction for future research. 
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Table 1 Percentage of people donating and average amounts donated to different philanthropic 
sectors (N=4,920) 
 
 Percentage of people 
donating to a sector (%) 
Average amount donated 
to a sector (RMB) 
Overall 31.93 191.86 
Religion 3.17 148.20 
Helping the poor and disaster relief 27.17 318.14 
Health and medical sector 2.44 40.40 
Education 2.72 34.59 
Environmental protection and animal 
welfare 
0.55 5.12 
Art and culture 0.22 0.67 
Community service 2.89 23.98 
Multiple sectors 1.03 9.99 
Others 0.81 18.63 
Notes: (1) percentage donating to a sector = number of respondents donating to sector / all 
respondents in this study (4,920). (2) average amount donated to a sector = total amount donated 
to a sector / all the respondents in this study (4,920). (3) According to China Statistical Yearbook 
2012, annual mean exchange rate in 2011 was: RMB 100 ~ USD 15.48. 
Source: Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS, 2012).   
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of variables (N=4,920) 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent variable 
   Total giving (RMB) 191.86 1,813.98 0 80,000 
     
Independent variable 
   Party member Party member: 15.98%; Non-Party member: 84.02% 
     
Mediating variables 
   Education 8.67 4.46 0 18 
   Income (RMB) 47,737.55 58,783.88 0 900,000 
   Formal networks 0.27 0.70 0 7 
   Informal networks 5.58 8.74 0 30 
   Prosocial values 4.37 1.19 0 6 
   Making compulsory donations Yes: 13.29%; No: 86.71% 
     
Control variables 
   Having a partner Having a partner: 81.42%; No partner: 18.58% 
   Male Male: 51.12%; Female: 48.88% 
   Age 49.18 15.96 17 94 
   Health status 2.53 1.08 0 4 
   Owning a house Owning a house: 93.41%; No house: 6.59% 
   Religiosity Yes: 13.52%; No: 86.48% 
   Happiness 2.84 0.84 0 4 
   Generalized trust 2.50 1.01 0 4 
   Voluntary services Voluntary services: 7.64%; No volunteering: 92. 36% 
   Having children Having children: 89.37%; No children: 10.63% 
   Rural Rural: 52.95%; Not rural: 47.05% 
   Urban Urban: 36.89%; Not urban: 63.11% 
Source: Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS, 2012).  
Table 3 Differences between Party members and non-Party members in total and compulsory 
giving, human resources and social networks (N=4,920) 
 
 Party members Non-Party members 
Total giving (RMB) 365.95** 158.76 
Education 12.11*** 8.02 
Income 70,689.41*** 43,373.69 
Formal networks 0.67*** 0.20 
Informal networks 5.86 5.49 




Notes: (1) + p ≤ 0.1; * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001. (2) We used independent sample T-
tests to compare differences in charitable giving, education, income, formal and informal 
networks, and prosocial values; and we used a !"	test to compare differences in compulsory 
donations. (3) Total giving refers to amount of giving, while made compulsory donations refers to 
making compulsory donations or not. 
Source: Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS, 2012).



































Education       0.106*** 
(0.029) 




Formal networks       0.452*** 
(0.105) 
Informal networks       -0.016 
(0.010) 




      6.550*** 
(0.159) 
Having a partner 0.644*** 0.383*** 0.037 -0.351 0.134* 0.452** 0.206 































































































































Having children -0.744*** -0.016 0.002 -0.518 0.141+ 0.324+ -0.060 












































Notes: (1) + p ≤ 0.1; * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001. (2) Unstandardized coefficients in the table; robust standard errors in the parentheses. (3) Akaike’s 
information criterion (AIC) = 116,535.9; Bayesian information criterion (BIC) =117,296.5. Log pseudolikelihood = -58,150.96. Left-censored = 3,349; Right-
censored = 0; Uncensored =1,571.  
Source: Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS, 2012). 
 
Table 5 Total, direct and indirect effects of Party membership on total charitable giving 
 
Effect decomposition Effect size 
Total effects 6.167*** 
Direct effects 0.177 
Indirect effects 5.990*** 
   Path 1: education    0.239*** 
   Path 2: income    0.116*** 
   Path 3: formal networks    0.145*** 
   Path 4: informal networks    -0.003 
   Path 5: prosocial values    0.056** 
   Path 6: making compulsory donations    5.437*** 
Note: + p ≤ 0.1; * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001. 
Source: Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS, 2012). 





























Education      0.151*** 
(0.045) 
Income (ln)      0.567*** 
(0.172) 
Formal networks      0.828*** 
(0.159) 
Informal networks      -0.031* 
(0.016) 
Prosocial values      0.506*** 
(0.117) 




















































































































































































Notes: (1) + p ≤ 0.1; * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001. (2) Unstandardized coefficients in the table; robust standard errors in the parentheses. (3) Akaike’s 
information criterion (AIC) = 110,846.5; Bayesian information criterion (BIC) = 111,542.1. Log pseudolikelihood = -55,316.247. Left-censored = 3,847; Right-
censored = 0; Uncensored =1073. 
Source: Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS, 2012). 
Table 7 Total, direct, and indirect effects of Party membership on voluntary charitable giving 
 
Effect decomposition Effect size 
Total effects 0.845* 
Direct effects 0.085 
Indirect effects 0.760*** 
   Path 1: education    0.320*** 
   Path 2: income    0.131** 
   Path 3: formal networks    0.238*** 
   Path 4: informal networks    -0.007 
   Path 5: prosocial values    0.077** 
Note: + p ≤ 0.1; * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001. 










Fig. 1 Conceptual framework for the relationship between Party membership and charitable 
giving, including mediating factors 
Notes: (1) We tested the effects of all the mediating variables on the relationship between 
Party membership and total charitable giving, but making compulsory donations was 
excluded when testing Party membership, mediating variables and voluntary charitable 
giving; (2) The expected direction between compulsory donations and total giving is either 

















i Unit (danwei) can refer to any organization people work in, which include a government 
department, state-owned enterprise, private enterprise, or nonprofit organization. It is a particular 
term for organizations often used in China. 
ii In terms of household registration (hukou), apart from urban and rural, there were four other 
classifications in CGSS 2012: Lanyin hukou, military status, no hukou and other. We included 
two variables in the analyses: rural (urban and others as reference) and urban (rural and others as 
reference). 
                                                             
